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失业保障制度在反失业中的双重效应及其构建方略 |
| [保险本科毕业论文] 【作者简介】夏杰长 中国社会科学院财贸经济研究所 【内容提要】本文首先论述了失业保障制度在治理失业中的积极作用，认为它虽然不能从根本上解决周期性失业问题，但却是反失业政策体系中不可或缺的组成部分，是反失业的“稳定器”和“安全网”；接着通过一个社会福利博弈模型阐述了过高的失业保障水平对解决失业问题的负面影响；最后对如何构建和完善失业保障制度提出了一些初步设想。 【英文摘要】The paper first discuss the active roles of unemploymentinsurance system to the setlement of unemployment problem,and considers although the unemployment insurance system can not take the periodical unemployment problem,it is the indispensable component in the anti-unemployment policy system.It is the stabilize and safe network of anti-unemployment.The paper also sets forth the view point that excessive unemployment insurance will produce negative influnce by use of the social-welfare game model.In the end the paper puts forward the preliminary idea in order to set up and perfect unemployment insurance system. 【关 键 词】失业保障/反失业/博弈/保险基金Unemployment insurance/Anti-unemployment/Game Insurance funds 【&n……
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